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The Shoe Industry of
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A Developing-Country Cluster in Crisis
ALLEN J. SCOTT
ABSTRACT. This study describes the main features of the shoe industry in the
Philippines, the core of which is located in Marikina City in the northeast of the Manila
Metropolitan Area. Initial discussions delve with general remarks on industrial clusters
and commodity chains with a detailed account of their internal structure and changing
fortunes. The deeply-rooted failures of the cluster since the early 1990s are pinpointed.
These can be directly related to the liberalization of the Filipino economy, and the
concomitant increase in Chinese-made shoes on domestic markets. Various private and
public responses to the crisis are described and evaluated. It is argued that as helpful as
many of these responses may be, their overall impact is likely to remain limited. Series
of possible policy options and their high risks of failure are emphasized. In conclusion,
the study presents a developmental scenario based on cluster upgrading and intensified
export activity.
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INTRODUCTION
This study seeks to attain three main objectives. The first is to provide
a reasonably detailed empirical description of the shoe industry of
Marikina City in the Philippines. The second is to explore the
predicaments and opportunities that the industry currently faces and
to elucidate a number of concomitant policy issues. The third is to
outline some of the implications of the study for questions of
industrialization and development in low- and middle-income countries
generally, especially under conditions of deepening globalization.
The shoe industry in the Philippines can be traced back for well
over a century (Ibon Databank 1986). The greater part of the industry
has always been concentrated in Marikina City in the northeast of the77 ALLEN J. SCOTT
Manila Metropolitan Area, where it assumes the spatial and functional
form of a classical marshallian industrial district. The output of the
industry today consists for the most part of cheap shoes fabricated in both
leather and synthetic materials for the domestic market. However, the
Philippines has never been in the ranks of the world’s largest shoe-
producing countries, and in East and Southeast Asia alone, it trails far
behind China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Indonesia, and Thailand, in terms of
both employment and output. Moreover, the industry has been subject to
intense competition over the last decade or so as producers from other
countries (above all China) have penetrated deeply into domestic markets
in the Philippines while simultaneously blocking out many export
opportunities for Filipino manufacturers. Currently, the industry is in great
disarray, and its future is extremely uncertain.
For these very reasons, the industry offers a rich terrain of investigative
possibilities, both in its own right, and as an exemplar of the problems and
dilemmas faced by many industrial clusters in less-developed parts of the
world as globalization moves forward. Above all, it provides an illuminating
case of the combined effects of two critical elements of the development
process in numerous low- and middle-income countries at the present
time. On the one hand, the shoe-manufacturing cluster of Marikina City
is a rather dramatic instance of the spatial agglomeration of small
entrepreneurial firms that characterizes many industries in the spatial
margins of contemporary capitalism (Scott 2002). On the other hand, its
current predicaments highlight, by default, the important developmental
role played by the commodity chains that link successful agglomerations
to wider markets, and that are so conspicuously absent in the case of the
Filipino shoe industry (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994).  In fact, the
Filipino shoe industry is currently subject to considerable stress on a variety
of fronts, a circumstance that poses a number of crucial analytical
problems, as well as an occasion for working out some diagnostic insights
into a series of developmental bottlenecks that are all too common
throughout the less-developed world. Equally, the present investigation
offers a number of opportunities for informed speculation about practical
policy-making in these situations, just as it points in the direction of some
possible addenda to development theory as a whole.
CLUSTERS AND CHAINS
Shoe manufacturing typically proceeds in a series of stages as follows. First,
basic leather or synthetic materials are cut to make the different elements78 THE SHOE INDUSTRY OF MARIKINA CITY
(sole, tongue, quarters, vamp, etc.) out of which the shoe is composed.
Second, a number of these pre-cut elements are assembled to make the
composite upper part of the shoe. Third, the assembled upper is
shaped over a last. Fourth, the uppers are attached to soles by stitching
or cementing. Fifth, the heels are then affixed. Sixth, accessories such
as eyelets, tassels or buckles are added to the finished shoe.
These features of the shoe-manufacturing process give ample scope
for variety in the organization of production and the division of labor.
In many cases, production is arranged in networks of vertically-
disintegrated firms, with each firm specializing in just one phase of the
manufacturing process. This manner of proceeding is well adapted to
the production of small batches of shoes with frequently varying design
specifications. In other cases, production is vertically integrated within
single firms, so that all the different tasks of shoemaking are performed
under unified managerial control. In the latter instance, an assembly
line usually links the different workstations together, thereby sustaining
a coordinated flow of semifinished product through the factory and
making it economically feasible to manufacture large runs of relatively
standardized outputs. Many different intermediate organizational
arrangements between these two exemplary cases are possible in
principle and observable in practice.
Of all these different arrangements, those that involve a substantial
degree of vertical disintegration are of special interest and significance
in the present analysis. Industrial sectors in which production is carried
out in this manner typically form dense industrial districts, and the
shoe industry is no exception to this rule. Indeed, the tendency of shoe
producers and their cohorts of suppliers to agglomerate together in
regional clusters or complexes is an extremely common occurrence,
both in more and less developed parts of the world (Hall 1962, Hoover
1937, Knorringa 1996, 1999; Morris and Lowder 1992, Rabellotti
1997, 1999; Rabellotti and Schmitz 1999, Rimmer 1968, Schmitz
1995, 2001).  The locational forces that lie behind this tendency are
many and various, but their points of genesis can usually be identified
by reference to three main facets of any disintegrated production
system, namely, (a) the networks of specialized but complementary
firms that comprise the active core of the manufacturing system, (b) the
dense and multifaceted local labor markets that invariably spring up in
the vicinity of workplaces, and (c) the tightly-wrought webs of social
interaction that often play an important part in sustaining localized
industrial innovation processes. The clusters that spring forth in79 ALLEN J. SCOTT
response to these forces are almost always interlaced with associational
and institutional infrastructures that function in different ways as sites
of collective decisionmaking and action in the interests of enhanced
industrial performance (Scott and Storper 2003). The shoe-
manufacturing complex of Marikina City is a typical industrial cluster
of this sort.
Of course, no industrial cluster can be economically viable in the
absence of a cognate system capable of distributing and marketing its
outputs on wider markets, whether domestic or foreign. Shoe producers
in Marikina City have always concentrated their sales efforts on the
domestic market, and their output is sold across the Philippines
through retail boutiques, department stores, and mail order companies
among others. However, these efforts have tended to lag in recent years,
and, in addition, the industry’s capacity for export activity is notably
underdeveloped. In fact, one of the central problems of the Filipino
shoe industry at large has been its signal failure to put more aggressive
distribution and marketing structures into place as worldwide
competition has intensified over the last few decades. Its failure in this
matter is all the more evident in view of the vastly more successful
efforts of a number of its direct competitors (such as Brazil, China, and
Mexico), and most especially in view of the ability of shoe-manufacturing
clusters in the latter countries to attract the concerted attention of
overseas traders and buyers (Bazan and Navas-Alemán 2004, Knorringa
1996, Korzeniewicz 1992, Levy 1991, Lowder 1999).  In contrast with
these more successful clusters, the Marikina City shoe industry has
never been incorporated to any significant degree in international
commodity chains.
Gereffi (1994, 1999) suggests that we need to distinguish between
two main types of commodity chains, namely, producer-driven and
buyer-driven. The former is generally associated with large-firm
manufacturing sectors such as the car or aircraft industries, where
suppliers have the resources to mount their own distribution and
marketing networks. The latter tends to be more characteristic of small-
firm sectors such as the clothing or shoe industries, especially where
manufacturers are insufficiently large to undertake distribution and
marketing functions themselves; and in these circumstances export
activities are often in the hands of big international buyers like
American and European department stores, wholesalers, or branded
manufacturers who are able to scour the world in search of sources of
product supply. Gibbon (2001) and Sverrison (2004) argue that we80 THE SHOE INDUSTRY OF MARIKINA CITY
also need to recognize a third type of commodity chain based on trader-
driven forces. Actually, the term “chain” is somewhat unsatisfactory in
the present context because it is usually defined in a way that
encompasses the double notion of a multistage input-output complex
and a system of supplier-buyer relationships. For present purposes, I
want to distinguish sharply between these two phenomena.  Hence, I
shall adopt what I take to be the more sharply focused terminology
“distribution and marketing nexus” to designate the latter.
An approach to industrial development processes that combines
notions of industrial clusters and commodity distribution and
marketing, would appear to promise much in the way of both
indicative and normative insights. The cluster idea directs attention to
the localized increasing-returns effects and competitive advantages that
are the lifeblood of many industries and the source of major growth
energies (Scott 2004b). Consideration of the commodity distribution
and marketing nexus, for its part, raises important and too often
neglected questions about the role and functions of external relations
in local economic development. The combination of these two critical
moments of the space-economy (i.e. clustering and external relations)
brings their mutually sustaining relations strongly to the fore (Humphrey
and Schmitz 2002). The terrain of analysis is further modulated by the
increasing returns effects, externalities, and market failures that
persistently run through these kinds of economic structures, and by the
collective action issues that are raised as a consequence (Scott and
Storper 2003). On the one side, industrial clusters are rife with
spillover effects that demand careful management in the interests of
overall efficiency. On the other side, distribution and marketing
activities are subject to transactional breakdowns that result in persistent
information gaps. As Lall (1991) points out, the received theory of
trade assumes that if any firm is able to match world prices, it can
immediately sell its output on external markets without further ado,
but in practice, the need for extensive scanning, monitoring, and
coordination, means that this process is far from being self-realizing in
the manner of a textbook model of supply and demand relations.
THE FILIPINO SHOE INDUSTRY: AN OVERVIEW
There is a notable paucity of systematic statistical information on the
shoe industry in the Philippines. The most recently published official
document allowing us to assess something of the industry’s broad81 ALLEN J. SCOTT
complexion is the 1995 Annual Survey of Establishments: Manufacturing1,
which records all data in terms of the 1977 Philippines Standard
Industrial Classification (PSIC).  The Annual Survey informs us that
there were 1,920 establishments classified under PSIC code 324
(Manufacture of Leather Footwear) in the Philippines as a whole in
1995. The total number of employees in the same year was 21,701. Of
all establishments in the industry, fully 80.7 percent had fewer than ten
workers. Average monthly earnings amounted to USD 53.33 in
establishments with fewer than ten workers and USD 143.94 in
establishments with ten or more workers, at then prevailing exchange
rates. For purposes of comparison, we may note that average monthly
earnings in Filipino manufacturing as a whole were USD 259 in 1995.
At the same time, the small-firm segment of the Filipino economy
(which includes most shoe manufacturers) is known for its extensive
use of child labor (Vahapassi 2000). The average per-worker book value
of the physical assets of shoe-manufacturing establishments with fewer
than ten workers was USD 567 in 1995, and that of establishments
with ten workers or more was USD 1,393, so that the industry as a
whole is notably labor-intensive, especially in the small-firm segment.
As meager as these fragments of statistical information may be, they
indicate quite clearly that the shoe industry in the Philippines is
modest in size, is made up largely of very small units of production with
low levels of capitalization, pays meager wages, even by local standards,
and is characterized by much informalization of employment structures
(Ibon Databank 1986).
In addition, the industry is strongly concentrated in geographic
terms. Figure 1 shows the overall locational pattern of employment in
shoe manufacturing in the Philippines. The National Capital Region,
which includes Marikina City, is by far the dominant center of the
industry with 39.3 percent of all establishments and 53 percent of all
employment. Two administrative divisions adjacent to the National
Capital Region, Central Luzon to the north and west and Southern
Tagalog to the south and east, account for the lion’s share of the rest
of employment in the Filipino shoe industry. Central Luzon is also the
center of the leather tanning industry, which is concentrated in the
town of Meycauayan. Southern Tagalog contains a number of
establishments that have spilled over from the Marikina City cluster
into nearby municipalities, and is also the location of Biñan, which
comprises a nucleus of small workshops producing for the bottom-
most segment of the Filipino shoe market. There is little shoe82 THE SHOE INDUSTRY OF MARIKINA CITY
manufacturing in the southern half of the country apart from a small
cluster in Cebu in Central Visayas. Note that the industry is made up
almost entirely of firms owned by local (Filipino) entrepreneurs. Over
a short period up to the mid-1990s, the Philippines also had a number
of large foreign-owned plants employing cheap local labor to make
athletic shoes, but these operations have now almost entirely shifted
to even lower-cost sites in other parts of Southeast Asia, most notably
 
F i g u r e  1 .  G e o g r a p h i c  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  t h e  F i l i p i n o  l e a t h e r  
footwear industry by administrative division. Area of circles is proportional 
to the square root of employment. (Data from National Statistics Office 
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to Vietnam (Barff and Austen 1993, Donaghu and Barff 1990). These
plants were never, in any case, functionally integrated into the Marikina
shoe-manufacturing complex.
Until the 1980s, the shoe industry in the Philippines was protected
by the high tariff barriers then in force as part of the overall national
policy of import substitution. The industry accordingly prospered in
a modest but definite way on the basis of its more or less complete
command of domestic markets. In the 1980s, import substitution
policies were largely abandoned by the Philippine government, and
over the 1990s trade liberalization accelerated greatly (Bautista and
Tecson 2003; Hill 2003).  For example, the average nominal tariff on
all manufactured goods was 33.7 percent in 1981 and just 5.4 percent
in 2003.  The average nominal tariff of leather, rubber, footwear and
travel goods fell from 17.6 percent in 1996 to 7.7 percent in 2000.
One effect of this policy shift has been a notable rise in imports of
foreign shoes into the country since the early 1990s (see Table 1) with
China leading the way as the main source of supply. In 2003, more
than half of the total value of Filipino shoe imports was ascribable to
China. By contrast, Filipino exports of shoes have fallen dramatically
over the same period, though the aggregate statistics are somewhat
misleading here because a large portion of the export trade until the
 
Table 1.  Value of Philippine imports and
exports of  footwear, 1990-2003 (in
thousand US dollar) 
Year Imports  Exports
2003       50,941  36,233
2002         49,668  35,547
2001        48,152  61,434
2000        51,058  58,448
1999        58,683  70,920
1998        52,905  135,150
1997        70,169    169,235
1996 48,872  138,048
1995        34,245  156,891
1994        31,447  176,335
1993        30,032  143,912
1992        22,525  120,993
1991        21,077  121,533
1990        20,022  78,001
Source: NSO 1990-2003.  
Note:  All data refer to items classified
under code 53 of the Revised Philippine
Standard Commodity Classification
(which is aligned with the United
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mid-1990s was made up of athletic shoes, and hence much of the
recent decline is actually an effect of the closure of the foreign-owned
plants where they were made. That said, exports have continued to
dwindle, even after the disappearance of these plants.
One of the principal factors underlying the continuing weakness of
shoe exports from the Philippines is the ever-intensifying competition
on world markets from producers in other low-wage countries. The
force of this competition is evident from the data laid out in Table 2,
which shows the world’s top ten exporters of footwear (excluding
Hong Kong, which is nowadays very largely a re-exporter of Chinese-
made shoes). The countries listed in the table export shoes at various
price and quality levels, but only those that produce for the low end
of the market currently offer head-to-head competition with the
Philippines. With almost 30 percent of the world’s shoe exports,
China is clearly the leading supplier of global markets, and it continues
to consolidate its lead. The Philippines with its relatively minuscule
export figure of USD 36.2 million in 2003 ranks far below any of the
countries shown in Table 2, and shoes remain a minor item in the
overall structure of the Filipino economy. Even in 1995, when trade
in Filipino shoes was much higher than it is now, exports still only
amounted to 1.1 percent of the overall value of domestic shoe
production. The small quantities of shoes that continue to be
exported from the Philippines are purchased mainly in neighboring
countries of Asia and in the Middle East. Little or no export activity
is currently directed to high-income countries.
  Table 2. World’s top ten exporters of footwear
(excluding Hong Kong), 2003 
Country Export  value  (in 
million US dollar) 
China 12,955
Italy    8,376
Spain    2,125
Vietnam    1,913
Germany    1,862
Belgium    1,663
Brazil    1,622
Portugal    1,497
Romania 1,420
France    1,277
Total world exports  43,315
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade
Statistics Database (COMTRADE).
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/.  
Note: All data refer to SITC 85. 85 ALLEN J. SCOTT
THE SHOE-MANUFACTURING COMPLEX OF MARIKINA CITY
According to unpublished data provided by the Marikina City
Treasurer’s Office, the number of registered shoe manufacturers in the
city stood at 248 in 2004, significantly down from the 513 that were
registered in 1994 (see Figure 2). A large number of unregistered firms
also exist in the city, but these have probably declined even more
rapidly given their endemically precarious economic status. The
detailed locations of currently registered firms in Marikina City are
shown in figure 3. Observe the dense cluster of firms located in the
vicinity of Shoe Avenue in San Roque, which is the traditional home
of the industry in Marikina City. Today, the industry fans out in a belt
running northward from this central reference point toward the
Nangka ward at the other end of the city. In recent years, small numbers
of producers have decentralized away from Marikina City and into the
neighboring areas of Antipolo City, Cainta, and Pasig City.
The vast majority of shoe manufacturers in Marikina are small in
size, and most of them employ only a handful of workers.  However,
a few large producers also exist, in some cases with employment levels




Figure 2. Annual number of registered shoe-manufacturing firms in 
Marikina City, 1992 – 2004. (Unpublished data provided by the 
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segment is based almost entirely on handiwork, and this segment shares
many of the characteristics of the widespread cottage-industry system
in the Philippines as a whole (Satake 2003). Production processes in
the larger firms are relatively mechanized, though considerable amounts
of manual labor continue to be used. Most of the machinery used in
these firms is imported from Italy and Taiwan. Vertical disintegration
of the production system is strongly in evidence, and even the larger
manufacturers regularly subcontract out batches of work. Manufacturers
of all sizes put out specialized tasks (like the making of lasts, insoles, or
uppers) to independent workshops, and many standard components
such as soles, heels, and shoemakers’ findings are bought in. Much
production is also carried out on a homework basis. One widely
practiced form of subcontracting in the industry involves placing
orders for batches of finished shoes with other manufacturers, and this
is especially common whenever firms are faced with a surge in demand
so that their own production capacity is temporarily exceeded. In spite
of the high levels of functional disintegration that generally characterize
the industry, some of the larger manufacturers have integrated backward
through the wider supply chain into materials production and other
service functions, (including, in at least one case, into tannery
operations), and forward into retailing, both in the greater Manila area
and other parts of the Philippines. This type of backward integration,
by all accounts, has not proven to be very successful, and locks
manufacturers into a relatively inflexible system of procurement.
Forward integration provides manufacturers with assured outlets for
their product and direct feedback about market conditions, but it still
does not really offer much shelter from the onslaught of the Chinese
competition. Indeed, many of the manufacturers who own retail
outlets are themselves now beginning to import Chinese-made shoes
for local sale.
Almost all of the firms within the industry are family enterprises
owned by individuals with roots that go deep into the local community.
Most firms are run by Filipinos (a small number of them being of
Chinese descent, especially in various supply sectors). There is, by
contrast, a small group of Korean entrepreneurs who have settled in
Marikina City over the last decade or so, and who are in the business
of making rubber and synthetic soles for the industry. A distinctive
intrafamily division of labor is frequently discernible at the managerial
level in many shoe factories, where the wife is more often engaged in
financial and commercial activities and the husband in shop-floor87 ALLEN J. SCOTT
supervision. A symptom of this tendency can be found in the fact that
of all the shoe-manufacturing firms on file with the City Treasurer’s
Office in Marikina in 2004, 43 percent were registered in women’s
names. A marked though by no means rigid gender division of labor is
widely observable on the shop floor in Marikina shoe factories.
Operations like cutting, stitching, and upper-making are customarily
carried out by women, while lasting and assembly work is dominated
by men. Workers in the industry are paid as a rule on a piece-rate basis.
For most of its history, the shoe industry of Marikina City
functioned as a small and modestly energetic cluster of firms, not much
given to innovative gestures, but thriving in an unassuming way on their
command of the domestic market. At the end of the 1970s and the
beginning of the 1980s, the industry was even able to capitalize on a
passing fashion trend in the United States, and it experienced a short-
lived bonanza in exporting snake-skin shoes to New York and other
large American cities. With the liberalization of the Filipino economy
and the rising tide of competition from Chinese manufacturers, the
Marikina shoe industry is now in the throes of a major crisis, with no
end in sight (recall Figure 2). Small producers eking out a living on the
margins of profitability have been particularly hard hit by these trends.
Moreover, the foundations of the agglomeration are being undermined
not only by direct competition in final markets, but also by a troubling
downturn in the local input-supply base as manufacturers turn more
and more to other countries (again, predominantly China) for their
requirements of leather, synthetics, accessories, and so on. As if to
underline this observation, a large proportion of the industry
representatives interviewed expressed much dissatisfaction with both
the price and especially the quality of locally made inputs, above all
leather, which is said to be distinctly substandard. Bulk buyers, in
particular, can obtain significant price discounts from Chinese suppliers,
and this state of affairs bodes ill for the continued generation of intra-
cluster competitive advantages in Marikina City. Even where
manufacturers are too small to avail themselves of direct foreign
purchases of inputs they can now increasingly buy imported materials
at advantageous prices through local middlemen.
The depth and durability of this crisis is currently provoking a
series of multifaceted responses in the Marikina shoe industry, not
dissimilar from (but considerably more intense than) some of the crisis-
induced efforts at collective upgrading that Schmitz (1999) has
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Brazil. The central question at this point is whether or not the Marikina
industry can now effectively restructure in appropriate ways and
whether it can muster the resources and support that it needs in order
to deal with the threats of the current situation.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSES TO
CRISIS
Virtually every industrial district, whatever its sectoral make-up and
geographic location, is associated with at least some sort of collective
order in the form of associations, conventions, cultural traditions, and
so on. The shoe industry of Marikina City is no exception here, and,
moreover, it has long had a well-developed sense of its own identity and
distinctiveness, as suggested by the sobriquet “Shoe City” by which
Marikina is known throughout the Philippines. With the advent of the
crisis of the 1990s there has been a rising will within the industry and
the city to deal with the challenges of the current situation, and a
concomitant effort to rebuild the industry’s institutional bases in the
search for enhanced competitive advantage.
One of the more important manifestations of this will was the
reorganization of the old Marikina Footwear Federation and its rebirth
as the Philippine Footwear Federation Inc. (PFFI) in 1992, with a
mandate to inject new energies into the local industry. The PFFI is
made up of a broad cross-section of shoe manufacturers in Marikina
City, but is dominated by a relatively small group of larger producers.
It aims to represent the industry in all relevant domestic and foreign
forums, and to provide shoe manufacturers with critical consultancy
services and training programs. The Federation hosted the Twentieth
Asian Footwear Conference in downtown Manila in 2001 and now
regularly leads delegations of Marikina manufacturers to international
shoe trade fairs in an effort to broaden and deepen export markets. A
PFFI initiative of special importance was the opening in 2003 of the
Philippine Footwear Academy in association with the Cottage Industry
Technology Center of the Department of Trade and Industry. The
Academy, which is located in close proximity to the shoe-manufacturing
district as shown in Figure 3, is partially subsidized by the government
of Germany. It provides training courses in a diversity of areas related
to shoe production (management, design, manual operations, and so
on) and offers technical advisory services to the industry at large. As
such, it is a critical source of positive externalities within the cluster,89 ALLEN J. SCOTT
and an essential adjunct to any wider effort of restructuring and
upgrading.
A further sign of the rising determination to deal with the
industry’s problems was the formulation of the Leather Footwear
Industry Master Plan by the Department of Trade and Industry in
1996. The Master Plan took note of the many current weaknesses of
the industry (low technological intensity, weak materials and
components base, poor marketing strategies, skills shortages, inadequate
availability of credit, and so on) and declared the government’s
intention to promote the industry as “a full-blown export winner.”
Notwithstanding the somewhat extravagant optimism of this resolve,
 
 
Figure 3. Geographic distribution of shoe manufacturers in Marikina City. Each dot
represents one manufacturer. Barangays within Marikina City are named, as are
adjacent municipalities. The inset shows the location of Marikina City within the
Manila Metropolitan Area. (Unpublished data provided by the Marikina City
Treasurer’s Office.) 
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the Master Plan functioned generally as a clarion call in a rapidly
deteriorating economic climate, and one of its more tangible effects
was the joint action on the part of the Department of Trade and
Industry and the PFFI to set up the Philippine Footwear Academy.
More recently, on July 2003, the Philippine Congress passed the
Footwear, Leather Goods and Tannery Industries Development Act
whose eventual implementation will provide diverse stimuli for the
upgrading of the shoe industry, including enlarged access to
governmental development assistance funds.
The office of the mayor and other agencies of local government
merit special mention here for their role as driving forces behind the
reawakened consciousness about the need for remedial action in the
Marikina shoe industry. Municipal officials in Marikina City have
maintained a constant flow of public reports about the industry’s
changing fortunes, and have sought energetically for practical ways to
promote its interests. In particular, the city has been a major supporter
of two recently inaugurated annual events with ostensible developmental
implications for the local shoe industry. These are the Philippine
Footwear Design Competition, which seeks to promote an enhanced
footwear fashion consciousness among local manufacturers, and the
Sapatero  (Shoemakers) Festival, which brings participants in the
industry together in a display of their diverse products and a celebration
of their corporate presence. The city also maintains a shoe museum
that functions as a sort of collective memory and symbolic focus of the
industry. The museum houses part of the huge collection of shoes
formerly owned by Imelda Marcos, many of which were actually made
in Marikina City. I make this observation to emphasize the point that
even if the current stock-in-trade of the cluster consists of shoes that sell
for only a few dollars a pair, it nevertheless harbors skills and aptitudes
that could be usefully re-harnessed in any program of overall upgrading.
In this context, cognizance also needs to be taken of the Samahan Ng
Magsasapatos Sa Pilipinas (League of Filipino Shoemakers), established
in 2002, whose founder and head is a local municipal official, and
whose principal objective is to ensure that any imports of foreign-made
shoes and raw materials into the Philippines do not evade the
remaining nominal tariff regulations.
Besides these initiatives, a number of attempts by selected groups
of manufacturers to improve the cooperative bases of the production
system are also in evidence. One of these is the Marikina Footwear and
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members. The Cooperative is designed to serve the small-firm segment
of the Marikina shoe industry. Members buy shares in the Cooperative
in return for which they are entitled to a number of services, including
the right to take out loans, to purchase raw materials at a reduced price,
and to discount letters of credit. The Cooperative also owns the B&G
footwear brand. Members are encouraged to manufacture shoes under
this brand, and the Cooperative itself then secures all distribution and
marketing functions. Another cooperative association of some
importance operates under the designation Sikapmo  Inc., which
translates roughly into English as “self-help”, but also puns with the
name of the locally celebrated individual, Kapitan Moy, who is credited
with helping to establish the shoe industry in Marikina City in the
1880s. Sikapmo was founded in 2003 and currently has 78 members.
Like the Marikina Footwear and Leather Goods Manufacturers
Cooperative, the membership of Sikapmo consists primarily of small
producers who are unable effectively to commercialize their own
products. Sikapmo has established its own brand (Marquina) as a
marketing opportunity for its members, and is currently engaged in a
vigorous campaign to promote the brand. A further example of
cooperative effort in the industry is the formation of a small supply
consortium, known as Unita, in which five local firms have combined
together in order to seek out economies of scale in the purchase of
various inputs. In spite of these concrete steps toward improved
cooperative relations, a persistent theme that emerged in interviews
with local shoe manufacturers was that high levels of mutual distrust
exist in various segments of the industry, and that much progress still
needs to be made in establishing a culture of inter-firm collaboration,
teamwork, and joint political action in favor of local developmental
issues.
DEVELOPMENTAL PREDICAMENTS AND OPPORTUNITIES
The Marikina shoe industry today presents the twofold image of an
agglomeration that is reeling from the effects of the competitive winds
that have blown over the Philippines since the 1980s, but that is also
the site of resolute attempts on the part of many different parties to
comprehend and deal with the roots of the crisis. We may ask, how
successful are these present attempts likely to prove? And, as a corollary,
what further action might help to turn the tide for local manufacturers?
The problems, to be sure, are enormous. As things now stand, the
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reasonably well in the past when it was virtually the sole supplier of
cheap footwear for the domestic market, but that no longer functions
at an adequate standard of performance. As long as tariff barriers
remained sufficiently high to exclude most imports, the industry could
operate with a fair assurance of long-term viability. Then again, the
industry’s overwhelming focus on the domestic market suggests that
the Marikina cluster has hitherto lacked the stimuli that might have
helped to promote quality upgrading as a defense against the competitive
forces to which local manufacturers are now being subjected. We
might also aver—with the wisdom of hindsight—that the industry’s
failure to cultivate a significant export trade at an early stage, when
competition from other low-wage countries was less daunting than it
is today, has left it increasingly shut out of international markets; and
with the passage of time its ability to surmount this barrier becomes
steadily less credible. The reasons underlying this failure remain
unclear, but the country’s long-standing political and fiscal complexities
have no doubt taken their toll, and in all likelihood discouraged
foreign buyers who might otherwise have shown more interest in the
industry at an earlier phase in the internationalization of the shoe
industry generally.
At the outset, there appears little likelihood that any significant
revival of the Marikina cluster might be achieved on the basis of simple
cost-cutting. On this score, Chinese producers are all but unmatchable,
given their advantages in terms of scale and workers’ wages. In any
thorough-going scenario of cost-based competition, the rate of decline
of the Marikina City cluster would no doubt slow down, but much of
the cluster would probably continue to atrophy over the longer term.
Production costs, of course, must remain under strict control if
upgrading efforts are to succeed, but any real turnaround in the
fortunes of the cluster—in the absence of a return to higher tariffs on
imported shoes—is not going to be attainable except by means of
significant restructuring. This in its turn presupposes a need for
continued major efforts of policy formulation and collective action.
Two general lines of attack can be immediately suggested. The first
turns on the advantages of Chamberlinian competition. This entails
much closer attention than has hitherto been the case to quality and
style issues, as represented, for example, by the construction of
distinctive Marikina City product images enabling manufacturers to
offset some of the pressures of competition on the basis of price alone
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of global distribution and marketing activities as a necessary condition
for the regeneration of external economies of scale and scope within the
cluster and the revitalization of its competitive advantages (Stewart and
Ghani 1991). These strategic options might well be backed up by
diversification into related leather-goods fashion products such as
handbags, belts, or luggage.
Neither of the above main objectives can be readily achieved
without simultaneously pressing heavily on a third policy lever focused
on matters of internal reorganization within the cluster, and including—
among other things—the formation of more collaborative, reliable, and
efficient interfirm networks and the recalibration of labor-management
relations in ways that genuinely increase employees’ commitment to
higher-quality and innovative work. Of course, it is one thing to
articulate general goals of this sort, but the details of how to achieve
them are an altogether different and more puzzling matter. As the
research of authors such as Halder (2004), Humphrey and Schmitz
(2002), and Meyer-Stamer (2004) suggest, any kind of upgrading in
industrial clusters is extraordinarily difficult to accomplish at the best
of times and many stubborn resistances to change are always present.
In the end, we need to take seriously the proposition that the different
participants in the shoe-manufacturing cluster of Marikina City may
not be equal to the tasks of establishing the complex virtuous circle of
upgrading, market repositioning, and export promotion, which must
be accomplished if the industry is to meet the challenges of the twenty-
first century.
Certainly, the institution-building activities and policy initiatives
that have already been set in motion are a step in the right direction,
though they remain at best in a preliminary and piecemeal stage of
development, and appear to have had rather limited impact on the
majority of local producers. The acid test of any durable improvement
in the capacity of the cluster to attain higher levels of economic
performance will no doubt revolve around its ability to shift decisively
into an export-oriented mode of operation. The construction of a
reasonably extensive nexus of distribution and marketing activities
serving the Marikina cluster will be essential to the formation of any
capability of this sort, and this will also necessitate a concerted effort
to pull foreign buyers into the cluster’s orbit. As already noted,
manufacturers in Marikina City are starting to reach out more decisively
to foreign markets by participating in international trade fairs, especially
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modest; and foreign buyers have consistently by-passed the Marikina
shoe complex for greener pastures elsewhere. Again, local producers’
concentration on domestic markets and their signal failure to make an
early and concerted start in seeking export outlets has turned out to be
a great handicap in the present. Schmitz (1995) reports that Brazilian
firms were exporting shoes as early as the 1960s, and that the Sinos
Valley is now endowed with a dense infrastructure of export facilities.
My own fieldwork in Marikina City uncovered no signs of any
significant shoe-exporting infrastructure, with the possible exception
of the Manila-based Foreign Buyers’ Association of the Philippines,
which in any case seems largely to have turned its back on the shoe
industry. Equally, manufacturers constantly expressed to me their
desire to export their products, but almost all, even the larger ones,
added the symptomatic afterthought that they simply “don’t know
how to go about it.”
Meanwhile, shoe-manufacturing clusters in other parts of the
world have accumulated impressive records of export activity, including
a very significant penetration of markets in middle- and high-income
countries. Producers in these clusters have undoubtedly learned much
from the experience of exporting and have thus had numerous
opportunities to fine-tune their process and product configurations at
regular intervals. Learning in this manner is sustained by the relatively
durable relationships that tend to crystallize out between local
manufacturers and foreign buyers as they go about their business, and
through which they negotiate and renegotiate product specifications,
price levels, and delivery schedules (Egan and Mody 1992). As the
literature on commodity chains points out, foreign buyers also
stimulate learning processes by continually raising their expectations
about standards of performance and pressing manufacturers to attain
them (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002). These push effects are sometimes
carried even to the point where buyers actively monitor manufacturing
activities on the shop floor. Relationships of these sorts, moreover,
tend to be worked out over long periods of time and are often
associated with much experimental trial and error. Under conditions
like these, a path-dependent dynamic of self-reinforcing change and
growth is liable to be set in motion. This remark suggests that clusters
that make an early start on the task of securing an effective nexus of
distribution and marketing arrangements for their outputs—and most
especially where this nexus is strongly oriented to export promotion—
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their lead with the further passage of time. By the same token, clusters
that lag in this task are likely to be progressively locked out of world
markets. Any serious attempt to reshape the shoe-manufacturing
cluster of Marikina City will have to confront the enormous challenges
posed by the circumstance that the cluster is a notable latecomer in this
regard.
WAYS FORWARD?
A helpful precept of economic development practice is that it is
generally better to work with what you already have than to embark on
some entirely new and speculative course of action (Scott 2001). On
these grounds, the ongoing efforts by many different parties in
Marikina City and in the Philippines at large to revitalize the shoe
industry have much to commend them. From all that has gone before,
however, it also seems fair to suggest that such efforts are likely to face
a high probability of failure unless they are underpinned by a concerted
and disciplined plan of action that can be sustained over a reasonably
long-run period.
The cruel choice for representatives of the industry at this point in
time seems to resolve itself into the difficult one of selecting the least
harmful course of action out of a set of options that all have high social
costs. Three major policy alternatives might be envisaged.  The first is
simply to do nothing and to bear with the fact of further decline. The
second is to return to protectionist measures so as to preserve the home
shoe-market for Filipino producers, but this would unquestionably
encounter much political resistance, both domestic and international,
and would, in any case, encourage further postponement of any
upgrading efforts. The third is to shoulder the burden of a collective
commitment to active restructuring that may, or may not, enable
producers in the Marikina cluster to recapture lost terrain, to rebuild
competitive advantages, and to expand into new markets.
The first of these options is the simplest, in practical terms, from
the point of view of the policymaker, though its overt passivity is not
calculated to gain much credit for any public authority willing to
espouse it. The second option is already being advocated by a number
of political figures in Marikina City. However, this approach is very
much a second-best alternative if the arguments presented above have
any force at the end of the day. The approach is in any case hampered
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this point in time, and by the extent to which the economy as a whole
has moved down the path of liberalization over the last couple of
decades. The third option is, of course, extremely seductive, and is
likely to be viewed with some enthusiasm by policy makers—at least to
begin with—but carries no guarantee of eventual success. The
complexities of this third option are compounded by the circumstance
that it cannot simply be reduced to an exercise in technocracy. Any
thorough-going program of restructuring of the Marikina City shoe
industry will also require an intense effort of political mobilization and
education. The point can be further articulated by noting that the
achievement of policy-induced change in industrial clusters that have
experienced prolonged crisis typically requires a parallel process of self-
transformation by all relevant parties, i.e. a conscious effort to change
habits and practices in the workplace and in the wider business
environment in the interests of building a more effective industrial
community (Scott 2001). This work of self-transformation itself hinges
at a minimum on a large and influential segment of the local community
being persuaded that the strenuous adjustments they are called upon
to make in the short and medium term are likely to be more than
recompensed by significant gains in the long run.
The present study can be taken not just as a commentary on the
trials and tribulations of the Marikina shoe industry, but also as a
window into many of the basic dynamics at work in other low-
technology, labor-intensive industrial clusters in less-developed parts
of the world today. I have argued that these dynamics turn upon a
twofold relationship between the internal organization of industrial
clusters and their external relations to wider markets. On the one side,
effective internal organization turns significantly upon disintegrated
networks of specialized but complementary producers striving
individually and collectively for superior product quality and innovative
outcomes. On the other side, external relations are both a means of
widening markets and conduits of critical learning effects for producers.
To be sure, these ideas are by no means new, and the spate of published
work on regional development and commodity chains that has
appeared in recent years, (see, for example, the list of references at the
end of this paper) has done much to sharpen our understanding of the
basic issues. One of the lessons that this work seems to convey is that
appropriate institution building across the entire field of socioeconomic
relations as represented by an agglomerated production system and its
associated nexus of marketing and distribution activities can greatly
enhance local economic growth and development. This lesson emerges97 ALLEN J. SCOTT
repeatedly from studies of successful cases, as represented in varying
degree by the shoe industry of Sinos Valley in Brazil (Schmidt  1995,
1999), the jewelry industry of Bangkok, Thailand (Scott 1994), or the
surgical instruments industry of Sialkot, Pakistan (Nadvi 1999a,
1999b). In any case, given the ever-growing competitive superiority of
Chinese exporters on world markets for cheap footwear (including
markets in the Philippines itself), the evident conclusion is that the
shoe industry of Marikina City faces the stark choice between continued
decline on the one side or drastic policy-induced restructuring on the
other. In this paper, I have tried to indicate some possible lines of
attack on this restructuring problem, but it bears emphatic repetition
that the costs and the risks are far from being negligible. D
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NOTES
1.    The Annual Survey  is published by the National Statistics Office of the Philippines.
The 2000 Census of Philippine Business  and Industry is scheduled to be published in
2005.
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